A journey through Taiwanese history among wars, diplomacy and geopolitical strategies which brought us to the current situation.
Lai Ching-te from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected president of Taiwan on January 13, 2024. Officially, the de facto independent island is called “Republic of China” (ROC), but how did we get here? What are the legacies of Taiwanese past? What is the situation now? What lies ahead in the future?
The past
Taiwan was governed by the Chinese imperial Qing dynasty from the 17th century until 1895. After the 1st Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), Japan defeated China and got control of the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, starting a forced assimilation policy in both territories. The island was therefore separated from the mainland during a period which witnessed various changes, namely the establishment of the first republic after the capitulation of the Qing (1911), the first phase of the Chinese civil war between Nationalists (Kuomintang) and Communists, and the Japanese invasion of China, which started in 1937 and was then embedded into the World War II broader context.
After 1945, the Civil War continued until 1949, when Mao Zedong-led Communists managed to defeat the Nationalists, who eventually repaired in the Taiwan island covered by the United States (US) and decided to later take back control of the mainland. The Nationalists were spearheaded by Chiang Kai-shek, who established an authoritarian regime in Taiwan known as “White Terror”. In this context, the legislative assembly was composed of non-reelected representatives of mainland provinces and martial law was in force for decades. As in many other places in the world, the US closed more than one eye about the authoritarian nature of the government, as long as it was fitting in their communism containment policy. During the first part of the Cold War, indeed, countries from the Western block were officially recognizing the Republic of China (the Nationalist government in Taiwan) as the only legitimate representative of China, antagonizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which had and still has the effective control of most of Chinese territory.
But everything changed in the ‘70s when US President Richard Nixon decided to start the normalization of relations process with the PRC, later recognizing it as the sole representative of China. Of course, this eventually implied the permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. The reasons behind Nixon’s move were several, among which there was the necessity to reinforce the anti-Moscow position – given the so-called “Sino-Soviet split”, namely the divergence of interests between the PRC and the Soviet Union (URSS), which occurred gradually after Stalin’s death. The American position about the Taiwan issue from now on was defined in two documents and it is arguably a masterpiece of diplomatic language. The Normalization Communiqué of 1972 (“First Shanghai Communiqué”) stated that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China, and Taiwan is part of it, and that the US acknowledge (and not explicitly accept) this position. But the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 – produced by the American Congress – is even sharper and argues that the issue between Taiwan and the PRC should be solved by the two parts, without the use of force. If someone uses force, it would be considered against American interests in the region, because it would harm the regional stability. This therefore authorized the US to give weapons to Taiwan in order to be able to defend itself (1). This position has been named by experts as “strategic ambiguity”.
At the end of the Cold War, Taiwan democratized, reinforcing its ideological relationship with the West and above all making his “abandonment” more difficult for US governments to justify to the public opinion. Politically, a two-party system emerged: on the one hand, there was the Kuomintang, the political heir of the Chinese Nationalists who retreated to Taiwan in 1949; on the other hand, there was the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whose identity was definitely more Taiwanese. The former has therefore been more willing to dialogue with the PRC government, because of its firm “One-China” principle, while the latter has been promoting throughout the time further steps towards independence and less trade ties – fearing economic coercion - with mainland China.
In 1992, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait reached a consensus on the long-term reunification goal, although the “routine meaning” of the “One-China” principle was not completely overlapping. But just in 1995-96, a crisis erupted between the PRC and the ROC, with the Clinton administration deploying two aircraft carriers in the strait to handle the situation. The PRC then took a step back because at that time it did not have the military capacity to properly confront that American show of force. However, this was felt by the communist government as an important humiliation, which still brings legacies nowadays as the balance of power is way less pending on the US’ side.
The present
In the last three decades, tensions between the two sides increased, especially in the very recent past, because of several reasons. Firstly, the PRC is now a global power which eventually aims to change the norms of the US-led liberal international order that was created after the end of the Cold War. Secondly, Taiwan has become a substantial economic actor because of its specialization in the production of crucial components for modern technologies, namely the famous microchips. And finally, the two sides of the straits now have two different political systems, with most Taiwanese caring about their democratic freedoms which would be threatened in case of reunification.
Both Joe Biden and Donald Trump have been strong supporters of Taiwan, increasing arms sales and assistance in general, for example providing COVID-19 vaccine doses when Taiwan did not have many. Officially, the US’ position on American defense of Taiwan in case of aggression has not shifted from the “strategic ambiguity”, but recently, answering a journalist’s question, Biden stated that « Yes, that’s a commitment we made » (2). This is not technically true because there is not a defense alliance in force between the ROC and the US (it ceased to have effect after the US recognized the PRC), therefore either the US president misspoke or there is a gradual change underway from ambiguity towards official clearer support. However, the US does not support Taiwan independence, as recently said by Biden (3), but just the maintenance of the status quo with its contradictions and ambiguities.
Coming to the very present, these elections were characterized by an unusual three-way race. In addition to the classic contraposition between the Kuomintang and the DPP, a middle-ground party named Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) gained more than 20% of electors’ preferences. The TPP’s candidate was Ko Wen-je, former mayor of Taipei, very popular among young people, he was committed to offer Taiwanese a third-way between Kuomintang’s willingness to get closer to Beijing and DPP’s more or less explicit independence stance. In the end, the DPP obtained the presidency with an unprecedented third mandate in a row, but it did not conquer the absolute majority in the legislative assembly, thus needing compromises to pass legislation in the future. Compared to some former DPP’s candidates, Lai Ching-te promoted a weaker position on independence - confirmed during his victory speech when he referred to dialogue and cooperation (4) - being aware of potential Chinese retaliations and to reassure Washington about his responsibility. However, the PRC threatened Taiwan voters to choose between « war and peace », and then dismissed the elections as local ones and an internal affair, being Taiwan considered Chinese territory (5).
The future
Predicting what will happen in the future is always challenging because there are too many variables to consider. Nevertheless, it is possible to at least formulate hypotheses based on the current trends, trying to foresee what are the options that will involve the broader Indo-Pacific scenario and the world in general.
As anticipated before, Lai did not explicitly claim official independence during his campaign and victory speech. Surely, he knows that this is not possible in the short-term, and that path would only put Taiwan’s security more in danger. Therefore, he will probably try to give continuity to his forerunner’s work with the “National Project for Hope”, aimed to achieve more self-sufficiency in terms of defense, but limiting the chances of conflict as much as possible.
Another crucial event happening in 2024 that will influence Taiwan’s fate are the American elections in November. It is true that Trump too supported Taiwan during his administration, however his nativist and sometimes isolationist foreign policy has worried other Asian allies in the past. For instance, he asked for more contributions to South Korea and Japan to keep on exerting deterrence on their behalf against regional opponents. If he succeeds Biden to the US presidency, then the Taiwanese government will have to make sure that the island will not be abandoned.
For what concerns the other side of the strait, the PRC remains loyal to its “One-China” principle, considering Taiwan a rebel province to re-annex. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has just started his third mandate as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and adding the reunification to his track record would surely make him one of the most remembered ones. Still, the military invasion of Taiwan is technically far from being an easy task. In fact, it would require an amphibious operation, something which is historically marked by heavy losses on the attacking side. Moreover, a guerrilla battle is likely to follow the potentially successful landing, involving even more losses within urban streets. Additionally, by now, the US are not expected to just support Taiwan with aid as they are doing with Ukraine, but they would intervene directly on the battlefield, with all the risks a war between the two biggest powers in the world would involve.
Conclusion
Taiwan has a peculiar history that still influences its present and future. The current status quo is probably both absurd and delicate: a de facto independent nation which relies for its security on a superpower that does not officially recognize it as a sovereign State and a neighbor of its utmost enemy that at the same time shares part of its history. The importance of past legacies in this scenario is often forgotten, but the Taiwan issue is not only a matter of money or supply chains. Rather, it is arguably an unsolved dispute of the last century that, in this increasingly geopolitically polarized world, risks escalating in a catastrophic epilogue.
Sources
1. Hass, R., Glaser, B., & Bush, R. (2023). US-Taiwan Relations: Will China's Challenge Lead to a Crisis?. Brookings Institution Press. (p. 20).
3. Alafriz, O. (January 13, 2024). Biden: ‘We do not support independence’ for Taiwan. Politico.
5. Stuart, L. (January 13, 2024). China skeptic wins Taiwan presidency in snub to Beijing. Politico EU.
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