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On Wednesday, April 10, 2024, the European Parliament (EP) approved a total of ten legislative texts regarding migration and asylum policy during the plenary session. The Pact theoretically aims to « reform the European asylum system based on the principles of solidarity and fair share of responsibility », but critics have risen both from those who consider it a further loss of sovereignty for member states (mainly populist, far-right parties) and those who perceive it as a threat to asylum seekers’ well-being (mainly NGOs and some left-wing parties). Consequently, despite roughly eight years of negotiations, the measure is still deeply divisive, partially because of the incoming EP elections in June and the instrumentalization of the migration issue. But what does it exactly contain?
First, it is important to know the difference between migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. According to Amnesty International, « A refugee is a person who has fled their own country because they are at risk of serious human rights violations and persecution there. The risks to their safety and life were so great that they felt they had no choice but to leave and seek safety outside their country because their own government cannot or will not protect them from those dangers [...] An asylum seeker is a person who has left their country and is seeking protection from persecution and serious human rights violations in another country, but who hasn’t yet been legally recognized as a refugee and is waiting to receive a decision on their asylum claim ». Finally, even if « There is no internationally accepted legal definition of a migrant », it is possible to conceive « migrants to be people staying outside their country of origin, who are not asylum seekers or refugees. Some migrants leave their country because they want to work, study or join family, for example. Others feel they must leave because of poverty, political unrest, gang violence, natural disasters or other serious circumstances that exist there ».
Once this crucial differentiation is clear, it is possible to analyze the content of the files just approved by the EP. The first one of the ten texts aims to put into practice the solidarity principle by ensuring a relocation procedure between “benefitting member states” - those more under pressure - and “responsible states” - those further from the main entrances of migration routes. Nevertheless, if they are not willing to welcome applicants, “responsible states” can opt for a financial contribution based on the size and the GDP of the country, although each member state « is free to decide on the type of contribution ». Furthermore, some have criticized the insufficient importance given to the asylum seeker’s choice about his or her own future: people generally will not have a voice in deciding where to be relocated, with some exemptions « to addressing vulnerabilities, including those of unaccompanied minors (art. 23 of the Regulation) and after search and rescue ». Finally, the relocation issue is expected to be opposed within the Council by Orban’s Hungary and, with a bit more of surprise, by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who has already declared his willingness to « protect Poland from the relocation mechanism ».
Moving on, the second text has been designed to address situations of crisis, defined as those which « render the asylum, reception, child protection services, or the return system of a given member state non-functional, and may also have serious consequences for the functioning of the common EU asylum system ». This Regulation has also the purpose to face circumstances when third countries or non-state actors use migrants instrumentalizing them to destabilize a member state or the Union in general. Examples of this kind can be traced back in the actions allegedly referred to Russia and Belarus when they pushed migrants towards the Polish EU border. This regulation proposes some derogations to the regular solidarity mechanism, forcing member states to participate but letting them choose among relocation, financial contributions, or alternative measures. Another issue about this regulation is that, within these crisis-scenarios, border procedures to apply for asylum can be shortened or extended, basically giving more autonomy to local border authorities. Some have claimed that these special measures could end up being against migrants’ and asylum seekers’ living conditions because longer periods for registration could become longer periods of « detention », or shorter periods could lead to superficial declination of many applications.
Beyond the first two texts, the most debated ones are those dealing with screening procedures and the one about Asylum Procedures Regulations (APR). The screening procedure has been deeply reformed in order to have more precise information, among which there are fingerprints and facial images. Probably, three lines of the official press release can be used to sum up lots of the reasons behind the critics mainly from NGOs and some left-wing parties: « Third-country nationals undergoing screening have to be available to authorities to perform the above checks and may be detained to ensure it. They will have access to emergency health care and essential treatment if they are ill ». Some have argued that this situation can seriously harm people’s conditions during the screening procedure, without considering the fact that using the word “detained” may further convey the concept of “Fortress Europe”.
The other text dealing with screening procedure is more technical and dives into the revision of the Eurodac, the common European Data Protection Supervisor. The revised Eurodac Regulation was proposed by rapporteur Jorge Buxadé Villalba, a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), being him a member of the Spanish well-known far-right party Vox. The text aims to « improve the collection of data on asylum applicants and irregular migrants apprehended in the EU member states territory through biometric data - by adding facial images to existing fingerprinting databases », but what has risen critics is the lowering of the fingerprints collection minimum age from 14 to 6 years old. Finally, the revision even wants to change the database from an application-based system to an applicant-based one, avoiding potential multiple requests.
The APR has been under the spotlight too because of its alleged discriminatory nature. In fact, people from « countries with asylum recognition rates below 20% will be subject to the border asylum procedure immediately after screening », which means that these people are not likely to enter the EU. Among countries with these low rates there is, for example, Morocco, and many asylum seekers that arrive especially in Spain will probably be rejected having passed by there. Actually, people from low-rates-countries, as well as « people that are considered a danger for national security or public order », and those who have « misled the authorities by presenting false identity or nationality information » are expected to not enter the country, but to be kept at the border within a sort of « “legal fiction of non-entry” », with all the humanitarian and logistic complications that this involves.
Several analysts have pointed out that parliamentary approval has been recently sped up to reach an agreement before the EP elections in June and this had both formal and content implications, leaving many unsatisfied. Moreover, within the European Union, legislation is usually proposed by the Commission, to then be approved, rejected, or eventually amended by the two legislative bodies, namely the EP and the EU Council (artt. 289 and 294 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). As a consequence, the Pact still needs the EU Council’s approval by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and some objections are awaited, such as the above-mentioned Polish and Hungarian ones.
Finally, it is possible to notice that the Pact has been a product of a consensus promoted within the broad center of the European party system. Most MEPs belonging to the far-right and the far-left have been against it for opposite reasons, while from the center-right European People Party (EPP) to the center-left Group of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) - with the important exception of the Italian Partito Democratico who voted against some files - the Pact has generally been endorsed. In the end, the Council still has the final word and regulations will start applying in two years, allowing us to practically witness if Europe is going to be an ever locked “fortress”, whatever the political situation will be.
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